Why sunnis are wrong




















The Saudis saw this as a declaration of war against their very monarchy and a serious threat to their rule, and indeed in some ways it was. This rivalry has been with the Middle East ever since with the Saudis supporting Saddam's war against Iran and with the two countries supporting different sides in Lebanon's civil war, for example.

But it did not come to define the Middle East until the invasion of Iraq, and especially with the Arab Spring. In , when the Arab Spring began upending governments across the Middle East, both Saudi Arabia and Iran again tried to fill the vacuums, and that often meant supporting violence. It also meant deliberately amping up Sunni-Shia sectarianism to serve their interests. In weak states, Iran and Saudi Arabia have tried to position themselves as the patrons of their respective religious clans to assert influence, and they have ginned up sectarianism to promote fear of the other side.

Sectarianism is just a tool. But that sectarianism has become a reality as Middle Eastern militias and political parties line up along sectarian lines and commit violence along those lines. You can see the same thing unfolding in Syria. The violence at first had little to do with religion: It was about the Syrian people versus a tyrannical government. But the Syrian government is allied with Iran, which means it is hostile to Saudi Arabia, so the Saudis see it as their enemy.

The Saudis and other Sunni Gulf states armed Syrian rebels who are Sunni hard-liners, knowing the rebels' anti-Shia views made them more hostile to Iran and more loyal to Saudi interests. Iran used much the same strategy, portraying the Syrian war as a genocidal campaign against Shia.

This helped Tehran attract Shia militias from Iraq and Lebanon that would fight for Iranian interests. Making the Syrian civil war as sectarian as possible also ensures that the Syrian government, which is Shia, will remain loyal to Iran. Sunni-Shia hatred in the Middle East may be new, and it may be artificial. But over the past decade, it has nonetheless become very real.

Sectarian fear, distrust, and violence now exists at a grassroots level. The hostility runs so deeply now that although Sunni-Shia tension is not ancient, it might as well be. Tribalism — that is, the tendency to side with your own group, however defined, especially in times of conflict — has its own internal logic and momentum that often has little or nothing to do with the demographics through which it manifests.

But once a society divides along tribal lines — whether they are religious or racial or ethnic — those lines become experienced as real. Consider Rwanda: Before colonialism, the line between Hutu and Tutsi was mostly a class distinction, and often a blurry one 1.

But about a century ago, Belgian colonists hardened the distinction, pushing the idea that Hutus and Tutsis were completely distinct ethnic groups and entrenching Tutsis as dominant over Hutus.

As such, after colonialism, political grievances fell along this ethnic line. Even though the ethnic distinction was arguably in part a modern colonial invention, Rwandans began to treat it as real, which helped lead to one of the worst genocides in modern history. There's debate over whether, or the degree to which, Hutus and Tutsis are ethnically distinct. Some studies suggest they are; others suggest they're in fact pretty genetically similar.

Suffice to say the genetics are complicated, but that Hutu and Tutsi views of their own differences have changed over time, which goes to show how malleable ethnic identities can be, and the degree to which supposedly ancient and unbridgeable divides are in fact modern inventions.

Consider also the city of Baghdad. For much of its history, Sunni and Shia lived generally peacefully, side by side in mixed neighborhoods. Say: To God belongs exclusively [the right to grant] intercession. To Him belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth. In the End, it is to Him that ye shall be brought back Koran Shiite Muslims.

According to Shiism, the Twelve Imams can intercede between mankind and Allah. The Apostle of Allah said to Ali: " - - - You and your descendants are mediators for mankind as they [human beings] will not be able to know God except through your introduction" Donaldson , Consensus and analogy can be applied by those scholars who are highly knowledgeable in the Koran, the traditions of the prophet, and Islamic law, and practice the faith in every facet of their lives.

The sources of Muslim law in Shiism are somewhat similar to those in Sunni Islam, namely the Koran, Muhammad's practices, consensus, and analogy. However, the determination of consensus is related to the views of the Imams, and more freedom is given to analogy than in Sunni Islam Nasr , Sunni Muslims strongly believe that the redemption of human beings is dependent on faith in Allah, His prophets, acceptance of Muhammad as the final prophet, and belief in righteous deeds as explained in the Koran.

The mercy of Allah will determine the redemption of all human beings. Even the prophet Muhammad is at the mercy of Allah. There are many other verses in the Koran which enumerate that the basis of paradise is the mercy of Allah and the righteous deeds of human beings according to the Koran and Hadith. Shiite Muslims are guaranteed paradise if they obey and follow Muhammad and the Twelve Imams. They are considered righteous Muslims, and the Twelve Imams are particularly respected because of their relationship to Ali and his wife Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad.

Sunnis believe that Ali and his two sons, Hassan and Hussain, were highly respected by the first three Caliphs and the companions of Muhammad. Any righteous and knowledgeable Sunni Muslim can serve as an Imam with the prime function of leading the prayers and interpreting the Koran and Hadith provided he is well versed in these subjects.

Sunnis also consider it heretical to impute to human beings attributes of Divine nature such as infallibility and the knowledge of all temporal and cosmic matters. The highest ranking present-day Imams Ayatollahs are believed to receive their guidance and spiritual enlightenment directly from the "Twelve Imams," who stay in continuous contact with their followers on earth every day through contemporary spiritual leaders.

The Ayatollahs thus play a vital mediatory role. Because of their spiritual role, Ayatollahs cannot be appointed by governments, but only by consensus of other Ayatollahs. Differences in Religious Organization The differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam are more than theological and historical.

They are embedded in the social and political structure of the Middle East. Sunnis and Shiites form distinct communities. Conversions from Shiism to Sunnism and vice versa are rare, and Sunnis and Shiites are expected to marry members of their own community.

The vital moments of life-marriage, birth, and death-are commemorated within the framework of the rituals of the community. Members of each community learn about Islam within the traditions of their own faith, and under the guidance of their faith's religious teachers.

Despite these traditions, the political loyalties of Sunnis and Shiites are affected by their country of citizenship and nationality. In , Iran, a Shiite country whose language and culture are Farsi Persian , was invaded by Iraq, an Arab country with a Sunni leadership but a Shiite majority in the population.

Despite Iranian appeals, most Iraqi Shiites remained loyal to Iraq, performing military service when required during the Iran-Iraq war. Both Sunni and Shiite Islam are organized in ways that reflect their beliefs. In view of the emphasis of mainstream Shiism on the role of the Imamate, it is not surprising that the Shiites have a more elaborate religious hierarchy than Sunni Muslims. With the exception of post-revolutionary Iran, the Shiite clergy has been more independent of the government than religious officials have been in Sunni Muslim countries.

Shiite religious officials have had less need to rely on secular governments for money to finance their activities, since they control substantial religious endowments. In the Shiite communities, the most important appointments to senior religious positions are made by Shiite religious officials, not by the state. In Sunni countries, in contrast, it is typical for governments to exercise control over the appointment of senior religious officials.

These governments have also assumed the right to allocate large religious endowments through government ministries created for that purpose. This makes high-ranking Sunni clergy more dependent on the government than their Shiite counterparts.

Sunnis are also more open than Shiites to the idea that the leading of prayers and preaching can be done by lay persons without formal clerical training.

Ian A. Merritt Friday, April 1, This lazy narrative of a primordial and timeless conflict needs to be replaced by serious analysis. And that should be one that looks at what the Sunni-Shiite sectarian contest has become in the 21st century: a modern conflict in failed or failing states fueled by a political, nationalist and geostrategic rivalry. These sectarian conflicts have become proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two nationalist actors pursuing their strategic rivalry in places where governance has collapsed.

What is happening is not the supposed re-emergence of ancient hatreds, but the mobilization of a new animus. The instrumentalization of religion and the sectarianization of a political conflict is a better way of approaching the problem, rather than projecting religion as the driver and root cause of the predicament.

Sunnis and Shiites managed to coexist during most of their history when a modicum of political order provided security for both communities. He comes from a conservative, religious family but only occasionally goes to mosque.

He said the only way he would be able to tell the difference between a Sunni mosque and a Shiite one would be if the cleric talked about Syria in the sermon. Every year, Shiites around the world mark the battle with processions that turn into festivals of mourning, with men lashing or cutting themselves.

Sunnis and Shiites come from the same root, they worship the same God. The Shiite powerhouse of the Middle East is home to a government led by Shiite clerics with oil wealth and a powerful Revolutionary Guard.

Tehran has extended its influence in the Arab world, mainly through its alliance with Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Since Sunnis have been dominant through history, Sunni clerics became subordinate to the rulers. The Shiite clergy, he said, has been independent of power.

This increases rifts. In a country where the Muslim population is overwhelmingly Sunni, many Egyptians know little about Shiites. The Shiite population is tiny and largely hidden — so secretive that its numbers are not really known. But ultraconservative Salafis, many of whom view Shiites as infidels, have become more politically powerful and more vocal since the fall of autocrat Hosni Mubarak. They often preach against Shiism, warning it will spread to Egypt.

She considers herself Sunni. Fouad said her sister has heard work colleagues criticizing Shiites. She told her Sunni fiance from the start that her mother is Shiite. He worries about Shiites spreading their faith. If someone is wrong and Palestinian Muslims are also almost all Sunnis.



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